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Abstract  
It is often presumed that negative campaigning has negative effects on the electorate. For example, this 
campaign strategy is presumed to suppress political participation, decrease trust in politicians and 
contribute to cynicism. Although far from all studies find support for these presumptions, there are 
empirical evidence suggesting that negativity decrease political efficacy, trust in government, and 
overall public mood. However, there is an absence of studies focusing on the effect of negative 
campaigning on Swedish voters’. Instead, almost all empirical knowledge is based on American 
citizens’. Since the political system, the campaign traditions and the electorate diverge substantially in 
the two countries, the external validity of those studies can be questionable. Consequently, the aim of 
this study is to undertake the first examination about the effects of negative campaigning on Swedish 
voters’.   
 
This study examines two effects of negative campaigning, as compared to the effects of positive 
campaigning: Political participation and trust in politicians. These effects are studied within a Swedish 
context, using an experiment that is conducted in the midst of an ongoing election campaign.   
 
The empirical findings do not support the notion that negative campaigning suppresses political 
participation. However, positive campaigning appears to have a demobilizing effect for voters’ with 
low political knowledge. For highly knowledgeable voters’, positive campaigning does by contrast 
seem to stimulate participation. Furthermore, the findings suggest that negative television 
advertisements, as well as positive television advertisements, decrease trust in politicians.    
 
Keywords: Negative campaigning, positive campaigning, election campaign, experiment, political 
participation, trust in politicians 
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1. Introduction 
  ”Earlier this spring LO released the film ‘Reinfelds Sverige’, that with suggestive pictures shows a 
cold and unhuman society that is said to be a result of eight years of conservative/liberal politics. 
Facts are left out and other things are biased, in order to really underline the lack of empathy of the 
prime minister and the entire bourgeois. This is a miserable development that neither favouring trust 
in politician, nor give the voters’ a fair picture about the different alternatives that exist in politics.”1 
 
The above quote is an extract from the editorial page of Göteborgs-Posten (GP) which is one of the 
largest newspapers in Sweden.  The quote illustrates the fact that negative campaigning is a current 
topic of public debate. Furthermore, the quote also illustrates that it is often presumed that negative 
campaigns have devastating effects on the electorate. E.g., negativity as a campaign strategy is 
presumed to decrease the trust in politicians, supress political participation and contribute to 
cynicism.
2
 Although far from all studies support these presumptions, there are empirical evidence 
suggesting that negativity does lower the voters’ feelings of political efficacy, trust in government, and 
perhaps overall public mood.
3
 However, it is important to note that the research field of negative 
campaigning also have found some positive effects of negative campaign strategies. For example 
negative campaigns tend to stimulate knowledge about the election and be more memorable than 
positive campaigns. Furthermore, at present there are no reliable, or clear-cut, evidences that negative 
campaigning depresses voter turnout.
4
   
 
Unfortunately there is no universal definition of negative campaigning. However, all the definitions in 
the literature share one main characteristic: The focus is on criticizing the political opponent rather 
than promoting your own politics. The concept of negative campaigning is often associated with 
American presidential campaigns. However, the campaign strategy is not exclusively an American 
phenomenon. Negative campaign messages have also been common in for example Swedish election 
campaigns during a long period of time.
5
 The opposite of negative campaigning is positive 
campaigning. In a positive campaign message, the main focus is on the party’s or candidate’s own 
politics (what the sponsor want to achieve or did achieve) instead of the weaknesses of the opponent.
6
   
 
This study examines two effects of negative campaigning, as compared to the effects of positive 
campaigning: Political participation and trust in politicians. Those effects are studied within a 
Swedish context, using an experiment that was conducted in the midst of an ongoing election 
campaign.    
 
1.1Research problem 
Although there are several presumptions within the public debate, as well as empirical studies, 
concerning the effects of negative campaigning there is an absence of studies focusing on Swedish 
voters’. Instead, almost all empirical knowledge is based on American citizens and the studies are 
conducted in a US setting. However, since the political system, the campaign traditions and the 
electorate differ substantially in the two countries, I find it difficult to draw conclusion about Swedish 
                                                     
1
 Editorial page (2014, 17 August) ”Sluta kasta smuts på motståndaren” Göteborgs-Posten. (My translation 
from Swedish).  
2
 Pinkleton et al. (2002), 13. 
3
 Lau et al. (2007), 1176. 
4
 Lau et al. (2007), 1178. 
5
 Ekengren Oscarsson, Henrik (2009, 21 of May) ”Höjer negative campaigning valdeltagandet?” [Blog post].   
6
 Brooks & Geer (2007), 331. 
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voters’ based exclusively on American studies. Consequently, there is an urgent need to expand the 
validity of the findings outside the US context. 
 
Let me provide some concrete examples of how Swedish politics differs from the political landscape 
of the US. Firstly, there are empirical evidences suggesting that the level of negative campaigning is 
considerably higher in two-party systems, such as the US, than in multiparty party systems, such as 
Sweden
7
. Additionally, the Swedish political system has a tradition of a consensus culture and there 
are quite some shared views between the political parties (e.g. regarding characteristics of the Swedish 
welfare state).
8
 However, in the US, there is a substantial polarization between the Democrats and the 
Republicans, as well as their party supporters.
9
 This polarization appears to increase in the US which 
is illustrated in the following quote by the political scientist Lena Wängnerud:  
 
“Several investigations indicate that it was more common with cooperation across 
party boundaries previously. It is not only the health reform that is at risk, but also a 
more harsh tone ripple outwards the states and to several issues, for example how much 
are to be spent on schools and how much are to be spent on prison officers.”10 
 
It is fairly easy to find concrete examples of the harsh tone that Wängnerud refers to. For example, 
Mitt Romney accused Barack Obama for falsehood and dishonesty
11
 during the election campaign 
2012. Furthermore, one of Barack Obama’s television advertisements, during the same election 
campaign, was also substantially negative:  
 
“Mitt Romney made 20 million dollars in 2010 but paid only 14 % in taxes – probably 
less than you. Now he has a plan of giving millionaires another tax break and raises 
taxes on middle class families by up to 2000 dollars per year. Mitt Romney’s middle 
class tax increase: He pays less, you pay more.”12 
 
This kind of harsh tone, personal attacks and serious accusations are far away from what the Swedish 
voters’ are accustomed in. Let me make a comparison: During the Swedish election campaign of 2014 
the liberal/conservative alliance released a highly debated television advertisement where the 
following statement was made:  
 
“Since the left/green parties have failed to reach agreements before the election, they 
will have difficulties doing that after the election as well. That means that you will get 
something else than you were looking for. Additionally, they cannot show how they are 
going to pay for everything they promise. It will cost. More than it is worth.”    
  
Even though the advertisement from the alliance did not include any personal attacks on individual 
politicians (as opposed to Obama’s advertisement), and even if it was free from any direct accusations 
of for example falsehood or dishonesty (as opposed to Romney’s statements about Obama), the 
advertisement from the alliance provoked strong reactions on discussion forums in newspapers as well 
as on social media:  
 
                                                     
7
 Walter (2013), 54.  
8
 Ljunggren, Stig-Björn (2015, 30 January) Den svenska modellen som välfärdssystem [Blog post].   
9
 Wängnerud, Lena (2010, 7 February) ”Polarisering av amerikansk politik” [Blog post].   
10
 Wängnerud, Lena (2010, 7 February) ”Polarisering av amerikansk politik” [Blog post].  
11
 Interview with Mitt Romney [fox news] (2012, 16 July) [Video clip].    
12
 Obama for America TV ad [stretch] (2012, 10 August) [Video clip].     
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“This is a clear example on an election campaign that sometimes appears to be more 
about portraying the opponent as an incompetent alternative of government than about 
present concrete policy proposals. An election campaign where the debating 
atmosphere is a panorama of mudslinging.”13     
 
“Nonetheless does the alliance in their advertisement say a bit about HOW they are 
going to create more jobs and what that mean for me as a voter. Not a bit. I think it is a 
pity and a waste with our time.”14 
 
Is it possible that the strong reactions against the relatively decent campaign advertisement are an 
indication of a widespread intolerance towards negative campaigning within the Swedish electorate? It 
might be that the Swedish voters’ are more suspicious and alienated toward negative campaign 
messages than American citizens because of the tradition of consensus, and consequently feel less 
comfortable with negativity. On the other hand, it might also be that the Swedish electorate is less 
sensitive to negative campaign messages: Negative campaigns in Sweden is more often issue-based 
and targeted against parties instead of trait-based targeted against persons (which the advertisement 
from the alliance is a concrete example of), and issue attacks is more often considered legitimate than 
personal attacks are.
15
 Furthermore, the level of political knowledge is somewhat higher in Sweden
16
 
than in the US, and previous research suggests that citizens who are less aware and knowledgeable of 
politics become more cynical, and that the trust for politicians decreases, when the media report about 
politics as a game or a strategy.
17
 In other words, there are theoretical arguments for expectations on 
both sides: That Swedish voters’ are less sensitive to negative campaigning versus more sensitive to 
negative campaigning than American voters’. What I view as most probable will be discussed in the 
fourth chapter, where the hypotheses of this thesis are formulated. However, the main point that I want 
to highlight here is that I find the external validity of previous (American) studies uncertain since there 
clearly are relevant differences between two countries. Therefore, it is plausible to expect that negative 
campaigning might have different effects on the Swedish electorate than on the American electorate.  
Consequently, the aim of this study is to undertake the first examination about the effects of negative 
campaigning on Swedish voters’.   
 
1.2 Thesis outline 
The thesis is structured as follows: In the next chapter the central theories and hypotheses within the 
research field, effects of negative campaigning, are presented. Thereafter, the third chapter summarizes 
the findings from previous research: What conclusions about the effects of negative campaigning have 
the scholars reached so far? In the fourth chapter the research question and the hypotheses are 
formulated. Thereafter, the methodological approach is discussed in the fifth chapter. In the sixth 
chapter the empirical results are presented and analysed. In the seventh chapter follows a discussion 
about the results: What are the implications from a democratic point of view? Finally, the eight chapter 
summarizes the central findings, discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of the results and 
make suggestions for further research.        
 
                                                     
13
 Johansson, Lizz (2014, 29 July) “Alliansens tårtfilm speglar debatten.” LT.  
14
 Olsson, Monica (2014, 2 August) ”Kom till saken.” [Blog post].   
15
 Walter (2013), 45. 
16
 Grönlund & Milner (2006), 396. 
17
 Schuck et al. (2013), 287. 
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2. Theoretical framework: Is negative campaigning good 
or bad for democracy?    
The literature distinguishes between two different types of effects of negative campaigning: The direct 
electoral effects and the systemic effects. The direct electoral effects concern the impact on a specific 
election and include effects such as affect for the target of negative campaigning, affect for the 
attacker/sponsor and the intention or probability of voting for the attacker and the targeted. The 
systemic effects deal with broader, and more long-termed, effects such as actual or intended voter 
turnout, sense of political efficacy, trust in government, and overall public mood.
18
 In this thesis I 
make the demarcation to neither discuss the theoretical framework, nor study the direct electoral 
effects. Indeed, it is an interesting question whether negativity favours the attacker, the target or 
neither of them. However, that question is beyond the purpose of this study. Instead this thesis focuses 
on systemic effects which I view as even more interesting, since those effects are essential from a 
democratic perspective.    
2.1 Does negative campaigning demobilize or stimulate the electorate? 
During a long period of time the unchallenged belief was that negative campaigning has devastating 
consequences for the democracy: The presumption was that negativity undermines political efficiency, 
citizens’ trust in government and consequently has a demobilizing effect by supressing political 
participation and engagement.
19
 Those claims are the main characteristics for the demobilization 
hypothesis, developed by the researchers Ansolabehere and Iyengar.
20
 In their book “Going Negative: 
How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate” from 1995, they presented three 
different theoretical arguments/explanations in line with the demobilization hypothesis: 1) Firstly, they 
claimed that negativity might discourage supporters of the candidate (or party) who is attacked. The 
presumption is that the supporters of the candidate/ party under attack will be less likely to vote since 
they become more skeptical to “their” candidate/party. 2) Secondly, negative campaigning might also 
make the electorate disentranced with both candidates. According to this presumption, there is a 
backlash effect against the attacker, as well as fallout for the targeted of the attack. 3) Thirdly, the 
authors also claimed that negative campaigns might demobilize the electorate since the campaign 
strategy results in cynicism and reduce the power of civil duty. This explanation led to the hypothesis 
that exposure to negative campaigns might not only decrease voter turnout, but also the sense of 
political efficacy and make the electorate view politicians as uncivil and untrustworthy.
21
 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar presented substantial empirical evidence in line with their hypotheses (the 
main results will be discussed in the following chapter) and consequently it became an established 
knowledge that negative campaigning demobilizes the voters’ and turns them off.22    
However, in the end of the 1990s some scholars started to challenge the demobilization hypothesis, 
arguing that negativity might on the contrary have a stimulating and mobilizing effect on the voters: 
The stimulation hypothesis.
23
 Finkel and Geer are two of the researchers who have presented 
theoretical arguments in line with this opposing hypothesis. The authors highlighted three theoretical 
arguments: 1) Negative campaigning is likely to stimulate political participation and engagement by 
                                                     
18
 Lau et al. (2007), 1178.  
19
 Lau et al. (2007), 1176. 
20
 Freedman et al. (1999), Lau & Brown(2009), 298.  
21
 Ansolabehere & Iyengar (1995), 109-110. 
22
 Ekengren Oscarsson, Henrik (2009, 21 May) ”Höjer negative campaigning valdeltagandet?” [Blog post]. 
23
 Freedman et al. (1999), 1189. 
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offering the voters a substantial amount of policy and retrospective performance information.
24
 Since 
more knowledgeable voters are more likely to participate, the increase of information should mobilize 
the electorate. 2) Negative information is given more weight in information processing and empirical 
evidence shows that people are more likely to recall specific policy proposals when they are exposed 
to negative advertising. Thus, negative campaigning might be more likely to provide information 
which can help the electorate to distinguish the differences between the political alternatives. 
Consequently, negative campaigns may help the electorate in feeling more confident about their voting 
choice and increase their involvement in political campaigns.
25
 3)  Negative campaigns might create 
stronger emotional reactions than positive campaigns. The authors claimed that these reactions could 
stimulate participation by arousing the electorate’s enthusiasm for the preferred candidate or party and 
increase the degree to which the voters’ care about the election. Furthermore, the emotional reaction 
may increase some individuals’ anxiety-level, which may stimulate further learning about the parties 
or candidates in order to unable more informed decision making.
26
 
As the above section infers, the main controversy concerning the effects of negative campaigning 
appears to lie between proponents of the demobilization hypothesis and the supporters of the 
stimulation hypothesis. Although, the research field have moved toward a more complex picture of the 
effects of negative campaigning, and while most scholars appear to have a more nuanced view point, 
the opposing hypotheses are still present in the literature. Consequently, the results of this study will 
later be discussed in the light of the demobilization hypothesis and the stimulation hypothesis: Does 
the examination of effects on Swedish voters’ provide most support in line with the demobilization 
hypothesis or the stimulation hypothesis?   
 
2.2 Potential moderating factors: Completing the picture  
As already mentioned, the research field of negative campaigning have moved toward a more complex 
account of effects. Most researchers presume that the effects are not uniform, and that they depend on 
the circumstances. E.g., the effects of negative campaigning might vary depending on the 
characteristic of the voter in question. The characteristic (also called moderating factor) which 
probably is the most studied is the difference between partisans and political independents.
27
 A 
partisan is a person who has a feeling of loyalty, attachment and identification with a party. As the 
name indicates, a political independent (also called non-partisan) is the opposite of a partisan. 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar are two of many scholars who have presumed that negative campaigns are 
likely to produce larger disenchantment for independents than for partisan. The explanation is that 
independents have weaker ties to the electoral process:  
 
“Negative advertisements appeal to the nonpartisan voter because they resonate with 
the already negative view that Independents have of American politicians, government 
and the political parties…The problem is that campaign advertising is not bringing the 
Independents voter back to the parties…it is actually driving people away from the 
electoral process.”28  
Partisans are by contrast likely to be more resistant to negative messages of the opposition, and 
reinforced when their own candidate or party goes negative.
29
 In other words, the authors claim that 
                                                     
24
 Finkel & Geer. (1998), 577.  
25
 Finkel & Geer (1998), 577. 
26
 Finkel & Geer (1998), 577.  
27
 Brooks & Geer (2007) Ansolabeheres & Iyengar (1995) Lau et al. (2007) among others. 
28
 Ansolabehere & Iyengar (1995), 98. 
29
 Ansolabehere & Iyengar (1995), 110. 
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partisans are likely to be mobilized by negativity whereas independents are likely to be demobilized by 
the same message. In my opinion, it is reasonable to expect that negative campaigning produces larger 
dissatisfaction among independents since they are not socialized in the political system in the same 
way as partisans. Nevertheless, I would like to point out that it might be an oversimplification to claim 
that all independents have “a negative view” on politics.   
Furthermore, less knowledgeable individuals are presumed to be more sensitive to negative 
campaigning than well informed voters’. The explanation is that campaign advertisements offers 
individuals who are not that involved in politics a costless way of learning about the political 
alternatives. However highly knowledgeable voters are unlikely to change attitudes because of a 
campaign advertisement since that message is just one of many of their sources of information.
30
 Thus, 
knowledgeable voters are expected to be more resistant to negative campaigns. Additionally, they are 
in general more certain about their intention to participate and about their vote choices, and therefore 
these things are not easily changed by a campaign message.
31
 For the same reasons voters’ with a high 
political interest are also expected to be more resistant to negative campaigning than those who do not 
find politics interesting.
32
 
In short, it can be stated that partisans as well as voters’ with substantial political knowledge and 
interest are more likely to hold persistent attitudes toward political issues or actors. Thus, many 
scholars expect that the effects for those voters differ from independents and those who are low on 
political knowledge and interest. Consequently, I will systematically test the presumptions that those 
factors moderate the effects of negative campaigning later in this thesis.   
2.3 Potential effects of different types of negativity 
Furthermore, different types and magnitude of negativity might produce different effects
33
. For 
example, uncivil negative messages, that are inflammatory, divisive and gratuitous,
34
 are often 
expected to have different effects than negative messages that are more civil in tone. Let me illustrate 
the difference between uncivil and civil negativity with a concrete example: Suppose that the Swedish 
Minister of Education, Gustav Fridolin, states “The principal explanation to the declining PISA result 
is that the alliance government have reduced the number of teaching jobs in the Swedish school.” This 
is a typical negative but civil campaign message. However, if the statement were made more 
inflammatory by stating “The principal explanation to the declining PISA results is that the careless 
and incompetent alliance government has reduced the number of teaching jobs in the Swedish school” 
it is a negative and uncivil message. The reason is that the additional words, careless and incompetent, 
make the same message far more inflammatory by describing the alliance government in harsher 
terms.  
Khan and Kenny are two of the researchers who claim that uncivil negativity is likely to produce 
different effects than civil negativity does. More specifically, they argue that civil negativity is helpful 
and likely to stimulates participation, whereas uncivil negativity is likely to result in alienated voters’ 
and consequently suppress political participation
35
. 
 
                                                     
30
  Ansolabehere & Iyengar (1995), 77. 
31
 Stevens et al. (2008), 528. 
32
 Schuck et al. (2013), 288, Lau et al (2007), 1184. 
33
 Brooks & Geer (2007) Fridkin & Kenney (2004), among others. 
34
 Brooks & Geer (2007), 331. 
35
 Khan & Kenney (1999), 878.  
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Further, there is one other central distinction between different types of negative campaigning, namely 
issue/policy-based attacks and trait/personal-based attacks. In issue-based attacks the focus is on 
criticizing the plans or policies of the opponent. In trait-based attacks the focus is on criticizing the 
traits of the opponent: In other words, questioning his or her integrity or competence.
36
 Let me 
illustrate the difference with an example once again. Suppose that Fridolin states “Jan Björklund has 
failed to reverse the negative trend in the Swedish school because he have been focusing on the wrong 
reforms.” That is an issue-based negative message. However, if Fridolin states “Jan Björklund has, as 
opposed to me, no practical experiences of teaching and that is one explanation why he has failed to 
reverse the negative trend in the Swedish school” it is a trait-based negative message.  
Several scholars have argued that trait-based attacks in general are viewed as more illegitimate then 
issue-based attacks
37
. The principal explanation is that trait-based attacks are presumed to be viewed as 
irrelevant and unfair by the electorate. Consequently, trait-based negativity might turn people of from 
political engagement. 
 
3. Previous research 
In the latest decades there has been a substantial expansion within the research field of negative 
campaigning in quantitative as well as qualitative terms.
38
 In a meta-analysis made by Lau et al., the 
authors used the findings from 111 (mostly American) studies about the effects of negative 
campaigning as the basic data for their analysis
39
. So in what direction did the findings point at? Does 
negative campaigning appear to be good or bad for democracy? Does it stimulate or depress voter 
turnout? And are there empirical evidence showing that the effects differ depending on the 
characteristics of the voter’ in question? Noticeably there are many questions to answer. However, I 
make no claim to provide a comprehensive literature review of all the studied effects of negative 
campaigning in this chapter. Instead the focus will be on four of the systemic effects: Voter turnout, 
political efficacy, trust on government and public mood. The reason for focusing on these effects is 
that they are the ones with the closest connection to the effects that this thesis examines: Political 
participation and trust in politicians. Thus, the findings of this thesis can be discussed in relation to 
what previous research tells us about the effects on voter turnout, political efficacy, trust in 
government and public mood. Furthermore, this chapter will in short present the empirical findings 
regarding the potential moderating factors partisanship, political knowledge and political interest, 
since these factors also will be examined in this thesis. Finally, this chapter will briefly present the 
findings concerning how different types of negativity affect the voters’.  
3.1 Systemic effects of negative campaigning 
Voter turnout is probably the most studied systemic effect of negative campaigning. Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar examined this effect with experiments in their work “Going Negative” and found that the 
effect of viewing a negative advertisement instead of a positive advertisement decreases intentions to 
vote by nearly five percentage points.
40
 However, twelve years later Lau et al., in their meta-analysis, 
investigated if negative campaigning depresses voter turnout by analyzing findings from 57 different 
studies, and the results showed to vary to a large extent. Several of the studies did provide statistically 
                                                     
36
 Walter(2013), 45.  
37
 Min (2004), Roddy & Garramone (1988) Thorson et al. (1991). 
38
 Lau et al. (2007), 1177. 
39
 Lau et al. (2007), 1178. 
40
 Ansolabehere & Iyengar (1995), 112. 
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significant effects, yet the results pointed to different directions:  About half of the studies were in line 
with the demobilizing hypothesis, indicating that negativity suppresses voter turnout. The other half 
were by contrast in line with the stimulation hypothesis, suggesting that negativity mobilizes the 
electorate. When Lau et al. combined all the 57 findings into a single analysis, they found that the 
mean unadjusted effect is -.07 (ns) and when adjusting for sampling error and measurement reliability 
the mean turned slightly positive (.02) - not significantly different from 0.
41
 Consequently, the authors 
saw that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and concluded that: 
 
“It follows that the research literature provides no general support for the hypothesis 
that negative political campaigning depresses voter turnout. If anything, negative 
campaigning more frequently appears to have a slight mobilizing effect.”42 
 
One might ask why many of the studies that examine the effect on voter turnout provides significant 
results but in different directions. Khan et al. offers numerous of possible explanations: The mixed 
results might be due to different research designs (experiments or observations of real campaigns), 
different data material (responses to surveys or election results), the source of the negative message 
(an advertisement from a political party or candidate or a message from the media) and on the type of 
campaign (presidential or not).
43
 In my opinion those explanations are plausible. Although the results 
of empirical studies should not be due to methodological concerns in the ideal world, that is 
unfortunately not always the case in practice. Also, I think that the recently presented moderating 
factors, and the different types of negativity can be a contributing explanation the contradictory 
results.   
 
Political efficacy is another systemic effect that several researchers have been studying. It should be 
noted that there are two different types of political efficacy: Internal efficacy and external efficacy. 
Internal efficacy is understood as an individual’s belief that he or she, with his or her different 
competence and resources, can influence political events.
44
 In other words, internal efficacy could be 
understood as an individual’s political confidence to participate and influence the political sphere.  
External efficacy concerns the individual’s beliefs about the responsiveness of the governmental 
authorities and institutions
45
- In other words, the belief that essential political actors and institutions 
are attentive to the citizens. Some of the studies have been focusing on internal efficacy
46
, other on 
external efficacy
47
 and some have investigated both
48
. As opposed to the effect on voter turnout, the 
effect on political efficacy point in the same direction: Negative campaigns slightly decrease the 
voters’ feeling of political efficacy49 (internal as well as external). 
 
Furthermore, the effects of negative campaigning on trust in government have been studied by many 
scholars. This effect is similar to external efficacy besides the focus on the government. In the meta-
analysis by Lau et al. the authors show that the effects on trust in government are negative and that the 
results are consistent. In other words, negative campaigns appear to significantly decrease the voters’ 
trust in government.   
 
                                                     
41
 Lau et al. (2007), 1184. 
42
 Lau et al. (2007), 1184. 
43
 Khan et al. (1999), 878. 
44
 Pinkleton et al. (2002), 15. 
45
 Pinkleton et al. (2002), 15. 
46
 Thorson et al. (2000) & Freedman et al. (1999) among others. 
47
 Craig & Kane (2000), Goldstein (1997) among others. 
48
 Jackson et al. (2005) & Rahn & Hirshorn (1999). 
49
 Lau et al (2007), 1184. 
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Public mood is another effect that has been studied. The definition of public mood is a “diffuse 
affective state, having distinct positive and negative components that people experience because of 
their membership in a particular political community.”50 An example of public mood could for 
example be the emotional impact a Swedish citizen experiences if Sweden won the FIFA world cup.  
The reason why public mood have been studied from a political scientist perspective is that it has 
shown to affect a range of political attitudes.
51
 E.g., it influences an individuals’ belief whether the 
political community in question could achieve its goals or not. Also, public mood have showed to 
predict how people perceive threats to the political community. Finally, there seems to be a link 
between public mood and other effects that have been discussed above: For example, external efficacy 
is associated with positive public mood, whereas mistrust in government is linked to negative public 
mood.
52
 So how does negative campaign affect the public mood? The overall findings from the 
literature suggest that the negative campaign strategy slightly lower the voter’s feeling of public 
mood.
53
  
 
Ansolabehere & Iyengar made the following conclusion in their work “Going negative”, after having 
presented their findings:  
 
“Whatever its causes, negative politics generates disillusionment and distrust among 
the public. Attack advertisements resonate with the popular belief that government fails, 
that elected officials are out of touch and quite corrupt, and that voting is a hollow act. 
The end result: lower turnout and lower trust in government, regardless of which party 
rules.”54  
 
Twenty years later, and several studies after, the statement above appear to be an oversimplification. 
Indeed, the research literature still point toward some problematic systemic effects of negative 
campaigning: Decreasing feelings of political efficacy, lower trust in government and public mood. 
However, it should be pointed out that the effects are rather small. Furthermore, when combining the 
results of several studies, there is no reliable evidence that support Ansolabehere & Iyengar claim that 
negative campaigning depress voter turnout.  
 
3.2 Moderating factors: Completing the picture 
Previous research supports the claim that different personal characteristics moderate the effects of 
negative campaigns. To start with, Lau et al., Ansolabeheres & Iyengar and Brooks among others 
present findings that negative campaigns stimulate partisans to vote, whereas it turns independents off 
on voting.
55
 In other words, the empirical findings regarding this moderating factor appear to be fairly 
consistent. However, Brooks has claimed that there might be a need to make finer graduations when 
investigating this factor:  
 
“….perhaps "pure" Independents, who are truly in the middle of the road and less 
connected to the political system, respond differently to negativity than "leaning" 
Independents, who are often more engaged in the political system to start with.”56 
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I think that Brooks has a valid argument. As already stated I believe it to be an oversimplification to 
simply diverse the independents from the partisans, and presume that all the independents are the same 
so to speak. In order to really understand the moderating effect of partisanship it would be beneficial 
to study whether the main difference lies between all kind of independents and participants, or 
between the independents who are the most disconnected to the political system and the partisans.  
 
Additionally, there are empirical evidences suggesting that the level of knowledge and interest 
moderates the effects of negative campaigning: As expected, voters’ who are poorly informed and 
uninterested in politics are more sensitive to negative campaigns than others.
57
 Furthermore, Schunk et 
al. also present empirical findings showing that citizens’ who are less interested or aware of politics 
become more cynical when the media report about politics as a game or a strategy.
58
 Although Schunk 
et al’s. study is not exclusively about negative campaigning, it is plausible that cynicism can be a 
possible effect for voters’ with a low political knowledge and interest when exposed to negative 
campaigns.  
 
3.3 Effects of different types of negativity 
Regarding the divide between uncivil and civil negativity, there are empirical findings suggesting that 
there are different effects. Khan and Kenney in their work found that civil negativity does not suppress 
voter turnout, but as the amount of uncivil attacks increases, the voters’ become more likely to abstain 
from voting: Especially political independents, voters’ low on political knowledge and voters’ with 
low political interest.
59
 In a later research conducted by Brooks, she provided evidence showing that 
uncivil and civil negativity might have different effects on different voters’. More specifically, there 
are a substantial gender differences in reactions to incivility: Men are disproportionality mobilized by 
negative campaigning as compared to woman. This implies that men are significantly more likely to 
vote as the proportion of negativity increases. Women, by contrast, appear to be less likely to go to the 
polls when they are exposed to uncivil negativity.  However, when the tone is negative but civil the 
effects on women and men are more similar.
60
  
 
Furthermore, some studies also point at a difference between issue/policy-based attacks and 
personality/trait-based attacks. Min has suggested that while the first slightly stimulate voter turnout, 
the second significantly depresses participation.
61
 However, it is important to note that not all studies 
have found this effect. Finkel et al., as opposed to Min, have suggested that trait-based negativity has a 
slightly mobilizing effect and that issue-based negativity demobilize the electorate somewhat.
62
 Min 
has explained this inconsistency by referring to the fact that the studies use different dichotomies: 
Finkel et al. uses issue versus traits and Min uses the policy versus personality dichotomy.  According 
to Min, his definition is preferable since it is more explicit and easier to define clearly.
63
  However, I 
am not fully convinced that this explains the inconsistency, since other studies use the issue and trait 
dichotomy but still get similar results as Min.
64
 Thus, more research appear to be needed in order to 
explain what causes this inconsistency and sort out what the effect is on trait-based versus issue-based 
negativity.  
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3.4 Demobilization or stimulation?  
So are the empirical findings presented above is in line with the demobilization hypothesis or the 
stimulation hypothesis? My answer would be that the findings suggest that the reality (concerning 
American voters’) lie somewhere in between the opposing hypotheses, and that the answer depends on 
voter characteristics and the context. The proponents of the demobilizing hypothesis appear to be 
correct in the claims that negativity undermines political efficiency, citizens’ trust in government and 
public mood. However, as opposed to what the proponents of the demobilizing hypothesis presume, 
there are no reliable evidences that these effects result in lower voter turnout. Furthermore, my own 
analysis of the literature is that the proponents of the hypothesis expect quite large effects. 
Ansolabehere & Iyengar have for example stated that “We would even go so far as to say that negative 
advertisements may pose a serious antidemocratic threat.”65 However, the findings illustrate quite 
modest effects. Also, it should not be overlooked that research suggests that negative campaigns also 
stimulate knowledge about the current campaign as well as memorability. These results are in line 
with the stimulation hypothesis, since the proponents claim that people are more likely to recall 
information when they are exposed to negative campaign messages. However, the foundation of the 
stimulation hypothesis is the presumption that these effects will result in increased turnout. Yet, at 
present there are no powerful evidence showing that negative campaigning neither depress, nor 
stimulate voter turnout for the electorate in general (although we have seen that some moderating 
factors appear to play an important part).  
 
Nevertheless, I would like to remind the reader that the previously discussed research is not 
necessarily valid for Swedish voters’. Consequently, it is time to pay attention to the Swedish voters’ 
and the context of Swedish election campaigns. In the next chapter we will turn to the research 
questions and hypotheses that this study aims to answer. However, before doing that I would like to 
end this chapter with a justification of the decision to examine the effects on political participation 
and trust in politicians. Firstly, why did I choose to investigate trust in politicians instead of for 
example trust in government? As mentioned, trust in government is an effect that several scholars have 
been focusing on. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the anchoring in previous research would have 
been more explicit with an examination of that effect. However, I find it interesting to investigate 
whether negative campaigning affects the trust in all politicians and not exclusively the trust for those 
who are in charge. Besides, trust in politicians is not only closely tied to trust in government, but also 
external efficacy and public mood. Thus, the results can be analyzed in the light of the findings on 
trust in government as well as external efficacy and public mood.  
 
As previously stated, voter turnout is the systemic effect that appears most popular to study. 
Consequently, it would have been interesting with results based on Swedish voters’. However, the data 
that has been used in this study was not appropriate in order to conduct an examination of the effect on 
voter turnout.
66
  Fortunately, voting is not the only form of participation that is important from a 
democratic perspective. At present there is an increasing diversity of different types of political 
activism in western societies´.
67 
Consequently, in my opinion there are valid reasons to examine other 
forms of political participation (which is being done in this study), instead of exclusively focusing on 
the most traditional form of political participation, voter turnout.  Additionally, other forms of political 
participation and exposure to election campaigns also tend to increase the propensity to vote.
68
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4. Research question and hypotheses  
The focal relationship examined in this study is described in Figure 1. The general research question 
is: What effects does negative campaigning, and positive campaigning, have on Swedish voters´ 
political participation and trust in politicians?   
 
Figure 1. Focal relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
Before presenting the hypotheses it should be added that that this study does not offer a 
comprehensive examination of political participation. To be more accurate, it is campaign specific 
participation connected to the political parties that is examined in this study
69
. However, for the sake 
of simplicity the effect is called political participation.   
 
Continuing to the hypotheses, I firstly expect that exposure to negative campaigning will suppress 
political participation for the Swedish electorate. Indeed, the overall findings from previous research 
point toward a null effect on voter turnout and since voter turnout is one form of political participation 
it could be argued that it would be more logical to expect a null effect on participation than a 
decreasing effect. However, I view the theoretical arguments that Swedish voters’ should be more 
sensitive to negative messages than American citizens’, (discussed in the introduction) as more 
powerful than the arguments that Swedish voters’ are less sensitive. I basically presume that Swedish 
voters are highly suspicious and alienated toward negative campaigning because of the tradition of 
consensus. Hence, they will feel uncomfortable with negative campaign messages which will result in 
demobilization, demonstrated in a decreased participation.  
 
Since negative campaigning is the opposite of positive campaigning, and since the two campaign types 
will be compared in the analysis, I find it relevant to provide a proper examination about the effects of 
positive campaigning as well. So will positivity, as opposed to negativity, stimulate political 
participation? Or will it not produce any effect? The majority of the previous studies do not tell us 
much about the effect of positive campaigning (which explains the absence of a review over research 
about positive campaigning in previous chapters). However, based on the few studies that report the 
effects of positive campaigning on political participation, I do not expect it to produce any significant 
effect. In Garramone et al’s. experimental study, the author illustrated that there were no significant 
difference on intended voter turnout between those who were exposed to positive campaigns and the 
control group who were not exposed to any campaign message.
70
 Therefore, I expect that the null 
effect will also apply on other forms of political participation, for Swedish voters, as well. 
Furthermore, previous research has found that positive campaigning is less memorable and attracts 
less attention than negative campaigning
71
: That is also a cause that contributes to my expectation 
about the null effect of positive campaign messages.     
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Main hypothesis 1a: Negative campaign messages will suppress Swedish voters’ 
political participation.   
 
Main hypothesis 1b: Positive campaign messages will not produce any effect on 
Swedish voters’ political participation.  
 
However, I do not presume that the effect size will be equally large among all groups of voters. As 
already explained, there are findings showing that negative campaign messages may stimulate 
partisans whereas it turns other voters’ of on voting: E.g. political independents, those who are poorly 
informed and those who have a small political interest. It is reasonable to presume that those personal 
characteristics are relevant for Swedish voters’, regarding other forms of participation as well. Thus, I 
expect to see interaction effects of partisanship, political knowledge, and political interest: More 
specifically I expect political participation to decrease more for political independents, for voters’ who 
are low on political knowledge and for voters’ who have low political interest when exposed to 
negative campaigning. Concerning positive campaigning, I do not expect it to produce any effect for 
any voter group.   
   
Hypothesis 1c: Negative campaign messages will suppress political participation more 
for political independents as compare to partisans.  
 
Hypothesis 1d:  Positive campaign messages will not produce any effect for neither 
political independents, nor partisans.     
 
Hypothesis 1e: Negative campaign messages will suppress political participation more 
for voters’ who are low on political knowledge as compared to highly knowledgeable 
voters’.  
 
Hypothesis 1f: Positive campaign messages will not produce any effect for neither 
voters’ who are low on political knowledge, nor highly knowledgeably voters’.   
 
Hypothesis 1g: Negative campaign messages will suppress political participation more 
for voters’ with a small political interest as compared highly interested voters’.  
 
Hypothesis 1h: Positive campaign messages will not produce any effect for neither 
voters’ with a small political interest, nor highly interested voters.  
    
Based on previous studies, I also expect negative campaigns to decrease Swedish voters’ trust in 
(Swedish) politicians. As stated above, the overall findings of the closely related effects, trust in 
government, external efficacy and public mood suggest that exposure to negativity has a decreasing 
effect. Thus, it is plausible to expect a decreasing effect on trust in politicians as well: Especially 
among Swedish voters who I expect to be suspicious, alienated and uncomfortable with negative 
campaigns.  
Continuing to the effect of positive campaigning on trust in politicians, null effects are expected here 
as well. Alike the literature that focuses on participation, the literature that focuses on trust do not tell 
much about the effect of positive messages. However, one study by Pinkleton et al. demonstrated a 
null effect of positive campaigning on cynicism.
72
 Although cynicism is not precisely the same thing 
as absence of trust in politicians (cynicism is broader based since it refers to mistrust toward the whole 
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political system
73
) it can be viewed as closely related. Consequently, I presume that there will not be 
any effect of positive campaigning on trust in politicians. Besides, the fact that previous studies 
suggest that positive campaigning is less memorable and attracts less attention then negative 
campaigning is another reason to expect null effects.   
Main hypothesis 2a: Negative campaign messages will decrease Swedish voters’ trust 
in politicians.  
 
Main hypothesis 2b: Positive campaign messages will not produce any effect on 
Swedish voters’ trust in politicians.   
 
However, just as regarding political participation, I imagine that trust in politicians will decrease more 
for independents and voters’ who have a relatively low political interest and knowledge. As already 
mentioned, there are indications that partisans, knowledgeable voters’ and politically interested voters’ 
are in general more resistant to negative campaigning then others.  
 
Hypothesis 2c: Negative campaign messages will decrease trust in politicians more for 
political independents as compared to partisans.  
 
Hypothesis 2d:  Positive campaign messages will not produce any effect for neither 
political independents, nor partisans.      
 
Hypothesis 2e: Negative campaign messages will decrease trust in politicians more for 
voters’ who are low on political knowledge as compared to highly knowledgeable 
voters’.  
 
Hypothesis 2f: Positive campaign messages will not produce any effect for neither 
voters’ who are low on political knowledge, nor highly knowledgeable voters’.      
 
Hypothesis 2g: Negative campaign messages  will decrease trust in politicians more for 
voters’ with a small political interest as compared to voters’ with a high political 
interest.  
 
Hypothesis 2h: Positive campaign messages will not produce any effect for neither 
voters’ with a small political interest, nor highly interested voters’.     
 
All of the hypotheses above are asymmetric in the sense that I expect that there will be effects of 
negative campaign messages but not any effects of positive campaign messages. The asymmetry is 
illustrated in figure 2 and figure 3 below.  
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5. Methodological approach 
5.1 Testing the effects with an experiment  
In order to answer the research question and to test the hypotheses above, an experimental design have 
been used as the methodological tool. The principal reason is that the experimental design provides 
good opportunities to make causal inferences.
74
 In other words, it offers good opportunities to study 
what effects negative and positive campainging causes by manipulating the independent variable (what 
campaign messages that are provided to the respondents) and by randomizing the participants to 
treatments and control groups. That the participants are randomized implies that everybody has an 
equal chance to end up in the different treatment and control groups: A good basis for assuming that 
the respondents in the treatment groups behaves as the respondents in the control group would have 
behaved if  they receive the same treatment (and vice versa). Consequently, the treatment effect can be 
appropriately estimated by comparing the outcome in the treatment groups with the outcome in the 
control group
75
: If any difference on political participation or trust in politicians is identified, then one 
can be confident that the diffrence is due to a variance in the independent variable.
76
   
 
Continuing to the study of this thesis, a data set based on surveys from the 2014 Internet Campaign 
panel (the E-panel) have been used. The E-panel is a part of the Citizens Panel (SW: 
Medborgarpanelen), and consist of a seven wave online panel study.
77
 It was conducted by researchers 
at the University of Gothenburg, in connection to the elections 2014, and the data that is used in this 
thesis have never been analysed before.
78
  
 
In one of the surveys that was carried out one week before the parliamentary, regional and civil 
elections, the respondents were randomly assigned into four experimental groups. Those groups was 
exposed to different television advertisements from political parties, from their election campaigns 
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2014: Group A was exposed to two positive advertisements, group B viewed one positive and one 
negative advertisement, group C was also exposed to one positive and one negative advertisement and 
group D was exposed to two negative advertisements
79
 (more detailed information about the 
advertisements follows in the Material section below).  
 
There are clear advantages connected to the decision to use the data set from the E-panel: Firstly, I 
believe that the experiment from the E-panel had good prerequisites to engage the respondents and 
make them pay attention since they were exposed to real campaign advertisements during an ongoing 
election campaign. This is a merit since engagement, curiosity and attention is likely to ensure that the 
effects occurring in the experiment mimic the effects that occur in the real world.
80
 Consequently, such 
experimental realism is powerful form an internal, as well as an external point of view.
81
 If 
experimental effects can be obtained during a real time campaign experience, we are more certain that 
they also would produce similar effects also in a non-experimental setting. 
 
Secondly, the data set includes substantially more respondents (N=2664) than I would be able to 
gather with my own resources. The large sample is an advantage since it increases the statistical power 
of the results. In other words, the probability to identify a significant effect that exists in the real world 
increases with a large sample.
82
  
 
Finally, I would like to end this section by emphasizing one weakness that is typical for the 
experimental design, and discuss the implications of the weakness for this study. The weakness in 
question is that the findings from an experiment are not likely to be a perfect reflection of the real 
world. Why that is the case is being explained in the following quote:  
 
“…the observational and experimental results should not be the same unless everyone 
in the real world is exposed to campaign ads, or there is no difference in the effects of 
exposure to these ads between those who do and those who do not experience them in 
real life. The experiments conducted by Ansolabehere et al. (1999), in other words, 
almost certainly estimate the potential, not the actual, treatment effect.”83  
 
With the above quote in mind, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the experiment of this study 
should be completed with observational studies in order to increase the external validity. However, as 
mentioned the fact that the experiment was conducted during a real election campaign makes is 
probable to expect that potential effects that occur in the experiment also are likely to occur in the real 
world. Furthermore, the “noise” from the election campaign (with all the political information and 
propaganda that the voters’ are exposed to) gives a realistic backdrop for the experiment. Most voters’ 
were very probable exposed to campaign advertisements in the real world. Hence, if effects of 
exposure to two television advertisements can be identified under such circumstances, those effects are 
very likely to occur in the real world as well. This implies that the advantage of using an experimental 
design in this study significantly overweight the disadvantages.  
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5.2 Participants 
The panelists in the E-panel were recruited through two different sources: About 50 percent of the 
respondents came from the website of the largest newspaper in Sweden, Dagens Nyheter (DN), 
through pop-up advertisements. All visitors of dn.se were offered to join the E-panel by answering a 
recruitment questionnaire, accepting an agreement and sign up to the panel by submitting their email 
address.  
 
The remaining 50 percent that were assigned to the E-panel were present participants of the existing 
Citizens Panel
84
 at the University of Gothenburg. Since the respondents participated in the E-panel on 
a voluntarily basis, they were not randomly selected in the strict sense and therefore one could make 
the objection that this study does not have an optimal sample. However, in my opinion the sample of 
the study is preferable to for example a sample of university students (which is the sample of many 
previous studies).
85
 The problem with such samples is explained in the following quote:   
 
“One potential weakness is that in many cases, experiments studying attitude change 
used samples of undergraduate students Although many laboratory experiments 
replicate when conducted with representative samples (e.g., Krosnick, Visser, and 
Holbrook 2000), there are many important ways in which college undergraduates are 
different from a generally representative sample (e.g., they tend to be more 
homogenous in terms of socioeconomic status, education, age, and often race and 
ethnicity).”86   
 
The principal problem with an unrepresentative sample is that it makes it more difficult to generalize 
the results with confidence, something that many experimental scholars struggle with. Admittedly, the 
sample of this study is not a perfect reflection of the Swedish population either. Of the participants’, 
31 percent were between 18-40 years, 38 percent between 41-60 years and 29 percent between 61-87 
years (M=50, 7 Median=51, SD= 15, 9) there were 63 percent men and 37 percent women. 62 percent 
had a bachelor degree or higher. One might note that especially the high educational level is not 
representative and I have to agree. However, since the panelists were recruited from a general 
population, the validity of the experimental findings are, at least, supposed to enjoy more external 
validity than e.g. samples of university students.  
Finally, the advantage of the large sample deserves to be underlined: A total of 2664 respondents 
completed the experimental survey - that is a substantially larger sample than the sample of several 
previous experimental studies.
87
  
5.3 Material 
As mentioned before, the material of the study consists of four television advertisements from political 
parties, from their election campaign 2014. Group A was exposed to one positive advertisement from 
the social democrats (SW: Socialdemokraterna) and one positive advertisement from the liberal party 
(SW: Folkpartiet). Group B was exposed to the same positive advertisement from the social democrats 
and a negative advertisement from the alliance of the four liberal/conservative parties in the Swedish 
parliament (SW: Alliansen). Group C was exposed to the same positive advertisement as group A 
from the liberal party and a negative advertisement from the social democrats. Finally group D was 
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exposed to the negative advertisement from the liberal/conservative alliance and the negative 
advertisement from the social democrats.  
 
One advantage of the experimental design is that all the four groups viewed advertisements from both 
“sides”: One advertisement from a party more to the left and one advertisement from a party/parties 
more to the right. Consequently, the risk that it is political attitudes, rather than different campaign 
strategies, that causes the potential effects decreases.  
 
Futhermore, the experimental design offers good oppertunities to test the hypotheses formulated in the 
previous chapter. If the hypotheses are correct, the respondents in group A should rate higher on 
political participation and trust in government then group D.  Group C and D should in turn be placed 
somewhere in between group A and D.   
 
Although the experiment created by the researchers provides good opportunities to test the hypotheses, 
it could have been strengthened further by including a control group with respondents who was not 
exposed to any television advertisement at all. If a particular treatment group can be compared with a 
control group as well as the other treatment groups, the estimation of the treatment effect appears more 
comprehensive. Suppose that the respondents in group A, who was exposed to positive advertisements 
exclusively, will show to have significantly higher trust in politicians than the respondents in group D 
who solely was exposed to negative advertisements. Then it can be stated that exposure to positive and 
negative campaigns have different effects. However, we still cannot know whether the respondents in 
group A would have higher, lower or the same trust in politicians if they were not exposed to any 
advertisement at all: Such a conclusion can only be drawn by comparing the potential difference with 
a control group.     
 
Even if the experimental survey unfortunately not was designed with a control group, there were 
indeed respondents who could not watch the films due to different kinds of technical problems. Since 
those respondents still answered the questions that this study uses as indicators of trust in politicians 
and political participation, I created an “artificial” control group out of them. It is important to note 
that this group is not a control group in the strict sense since no randomization of them was made. 
However, this group can be regarded as a control group, given that the respondents share the same 
characteristics with the respondents in the treatment groups. Consequently, the randomization check 
presented in the following section includes the “artificial” control group as well. Finally, it should be 
noted that the control group is smaller than the treatment groups (N= 98 respondents as compared to 
N= 638, N= 639 and N= 641). However,  my assessment is that the control group is sufficiently large 
to qualify for inclusion in the experiment.   
 
After viewing the advertisements, the participants were asked to complete the survey by answering 
some more questions. One battery of questions is an appropriate indicator for trust in politicians. 
Another battery of questions, that were included in the panel vawe one week after the experimental 
survey, is a suitable indicator for political participation (see next section for more detailed descriptions 
of the operationalizations of the dependent variables). Hence, this thesis uses the material conducted 
from the E-panel in order to make a post-test experiment about effects of negative and positive 
campaigns on political participation trust in politicians. 
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5.4 Operationalization of the dependent variables 
It have already been explained how the independent variable, exposure to negative and positive 
campaign messages, was operationalized. However, not much have been said about how the dependent 
variables political participation and trust in politicians  were operationalized. In order to meassure 
political participation an index based on the following battery of questions was constructed
88
: 1) Did 
you read any election brochure or similar printed material from any party? 2) Did you visit any 
homepage of the political parties’ webpages? 3) Did you participate in any election meeting or some 
other event arranged by a political party?  4) Were you in personal contact with any election worker in 
your workplace? 5) Did you look at any television advertisement of film clip from the parties through 
the Internet? 6) Did you take part in the information from the parties through social media on internet 
such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram? 7) Did you take part in results from opinion polls? There 
were three possible answers on each of the questions: “Yes, several times”,  “Yes, occasionally” and 
“No”.89  
 
Regarding the operationalization of political participation, it might be objected that some of the 
questions can be said to measure consumption of campaign messages rather than political participation 
(e.g. the question about reading election brochures). This is a question concerning what should be 
counted as participation or not. However, if one thinks that some of the questions are measuring 
campaign consumption rather then participation, it should be noted that there are empirical evidence 
which shows that attention to campaign communication is closely associated with political 
participation, even under control for social backround and political attitudes. This implies that those 
who consume different types of campaign communications prove consistently more politically 
active.
90
 Hence, I do not view it as problematic to combine these questions with the more clear-cut 
participation questions (e.g. the question about participation in election meetings).  
 
The second dependent variable, trust in politicians, was operationalized by constructing an additive 
index based on the following statements from the experimental survey: 1) Swedish politicians do their 
best in order to improve for the average man. 2) Politicians are just interested in getting peoples votes 
but not of their opinions. 3) Those who are in the parliament do not take much account to what the 
average man thinks. 4) Swedish politicians make good on their election pledges most of the time. 
There were five possible answers on every statement ranging from “Do not Assent at all” to “Assent 
Completely”91. For statement 2 and 3, the answers were reversed in order to create the additive 
index.Using similar questions in order to measure trust in politicians is a recognized strategy.
92
 Thus, 
the external validity should be appropriate.  
 
Finally, I would like to underline the advantage that both of the dependent variables have been 
operationalized by constructing composite indexes. The reason is that a composite index make up for 
random variation in separate questions.
93
 Consequently, an index provides a more valid measurement 
then just using one question as an indicator. 
 
 
                                                     
88
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5.5 Operationalization of the potential moderating factors 
Partisanship was operationalized by using two questions raised in the panel step one week before the 
experimental survey. This is an advantage from a causal point of view: One cannot reasonably make 
the objection that partisanship has been affected by the experiment rather than the other way around.  
The first question that was asked was: What party do you like the most? and the second question was a 
follow-up question, asking: Do you consider yourself being a convinced supporters of that party.
94
 A 
dichotomous partianship-variable was made out of these two questions: The respondents who 
answered “Do not know/do not want to answer” on the first question was catagorized as independents 
together with the respondents who answered “No” on the follow-up question. The respondents who 
answered “Yes, very convinced” and “Yes, somewhat convinced” on the follow-up question was in 
turn categorized as partisans.  
 
It should be noted that in American studies, partisanship is usually measured by using the following 
serie of questions: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, 
an Independent or what? Would you call yourself a strong Republican (Democrat) or a not very strong 
Republican (Democrat)? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?
95
  
A seven point scale is then provided from this series of questions: Strong Democrat, weak Democrat, 
independet leaning toward the Democrats, independent not leaning toward a party, independent 
leaning toward the Republicans, weak Republican and strong Republican. However, this 
operationalization cannot been applied on a country with a multipartysystem. Let me explain why: In a 
two-party system like the one in the US it is reasonable to take only the two major parties into account. 
This enables the possibility to provide the seven-point scale as a measure of partisanship. Yet, in a 
multipartysystem, with more than two relevant parties, it is difficult to mention the names of all the 
parties in the question wording (imagine Sweden that has eight different parties in the parliament). 
This can be seen as a disadvantage since a variable on a seven point scale would enable a more fine 
graded analysis than a dichotomous variable. However, the present operationalization is the best that 
could be provided on a Swedish context and with the data at hand.  
 
Political knowledge is frequently operationalized by measuring the respondents’ ability to provide 
correct answers to fact-based questions.
96
 Consequently, this potential moderating factor was 
operationalized by constructing an index based on a battery of fact based statements such as: “A party 
must get 6 percent of the votes in order to get seats in the Swedish parliament”, and a battery of 
questions that measures knowledge about well-known politicians party belonging
97
. The combination 
of these two types of fact questions provided a fine graded knowledge-index, ranging from 0 (no 
correct answers) to 1 (all answers correct ).   
It should be noted that one weakness with the battery of fact based statements from the E-panel is that 
the respondents might have cheated when answering - e.g. by Googling the correct answer. In order to 
enure that the respondends did not cheat while picking the answers, but instead based their answers on 
previous knowledge, the time period for answering could have been restricted (so that the respondents 
would not have enough time for Googeling the right answer). Another possible way could have been 
to use timestamps: If it would prove that some respondents were taking very long time to answer, that 
would be a reason to suspect that the respondents might have cheated. Consequently, those 
respondents could have been excluded from the statistical analysis.  However, these are not optimal 
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solutions in order to identify cheaters since the the vast majority of the questions that are appropriate 
to ask in a survey can be Googled up in an instant
98
.  
 
Although it appears difficult to determine whether cheating have been taking place or not in 
surveys, it is resonable to expect that the problem decreases the more knowledge questions the 
respondents are urged to answer: Understandably it takes more time and energy to Google 20 answers 
then to just Google a single one. Thus, it is an advantage that over 20 questions that measures political 
knowledge are included in the same survey from the E-panel.     
 
Political interest could simply have been operationalized by using the following question from the E-
panel: How interested are you in general in politics? However, I see a substantial risk that some 
individuals are likely to report political interest because they view it as socialy desirable. Such answers 
would result in so called social desirability bias: Biases that are caused by the fact that respondents 
give answers that they view as socially desirable.
99
  
 
In order to avoid a social desirability bias, an index of questions that can be viewed as indirect 
indicators of political interest, was composed. The respondents were asked: Which of the following 
election program in radio and TV have you been exposed to the past week? The question also refers to 
if you have been taking part of the transmissions through the Internet. Thereafter, different programs 
were listed and there were 4 possible answers: “Yes in full”, “Yes partly”, “No” and “Do not know/ 
Do not remember”100. Finally, it should be noted that these questions were asked before the 
experiment which ensures that the experiment did not affect the interest.  
 
5.6 Research ethics  
Experiments are often being criticized for the practice of denying a “known good” to some of the 
experimental group/ groups. E.g., to intentionally improve the educational level of some children, in 
order to compare them with other children appear unethical, given the general belief in the positive 
externalities related to schooling.
101
  Fortunately it is very unlikely that similar ethical problems 
appeared when conducting the experiment that this study is based on. Suppose that exposure to the 
positive advertisements exclusively is the “better treatment”.  Even if that is the case, it would be far-
fetched to expect that exposure to those advertisements would have any long-lasting effects on the 
respondents’ personal life situation that can be compared with the potential effects of additional years 
of schooling.    
 
Furthermore, experiments might produce unintended effects (also called second-order 
consequences).
102
 Suppose for example that exposure to negative campaign advertisements decreases 
political participation as well as trust in politicians. If that would be the case, the researchers can be 
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said to unintendedly contribute to those effects when conducting the experiment, by spreading the 
negative advertisements. The question is then, can that be ethical defensible?  In my opinion that 
might have been questionable if the advertisements were fictional (at least if the participants were not 
debriefed afterwards). However, the advertisements in the experiment of the E-panel are real and were 
showed on television several times a day during the election period. Thus, I consider the experiment to 
be ethical defensible: To prevent individuals from information from the real world, neither can be, nor 
should be a part of the scientists’ responsibility.  
 
Finally, one could make the objection that the panelists were not debriefed about the experiment 
afterwards.
103
 That can be viewed as slightly problematic since it is an ethical code to “provide 
participants with accurate and appropriate information about the nature of the experiment or 
study.”104 Thus, from an ethical perspective it would have been beneficial to debrief the respondents. 
However, I think that debriefing would have been more essential if the experiment involved 
manipulated treatments (e.g. fictional campaign advertisements). Furthermore, it might be noted that 
approval of an agreement was a precondition for participate in the E-panel. This agreement included a 
description about the Citizens Panel, instructions for deregistering and management of information
105
 
 
In sum, it can be stated with some self-assurance that it is very unlikely that the experiment have 
produced any actual damage. However, from an ethical point of view it would have been profitable 
with some debriefing of the respondents.   
 
6. Results 
6.1 Randomization- and manipulation checks 
Before analysing the results, a randomization check was conducted  in order to control that there were 
no differences, apart from different manipulations, between the groups. The result showed that there 
were no significant differences, on a 95 percent level, due to age (, 939), education (, 166), 
partisanship (, 300), political knowledge (, 641) or political interest (, 991). However, there was a 
significant difference due to gender (, 000).  When studying the gender difference in close, by 
comparing the separate groups with Tukey HDS, it became clear that there were significantly more 
women in the “artificial”  control group as compared to the treatment groups. This indicate that there 
was a covariation between gender and the reporting of technical difficulties watching the films. 
However, it should also be reminded that in five of six cases the  artificial control group did not differ 
from the treatment groups. Thus, my assessment is that this group can be regarded as an actual control 
group. Yet, the risk that the findings are due to the gender diffrence between the groups needed to be 
excluded, and therefore gender is controlled for in all the regression analyses of this study.   
 
Secondly, a manipulation check was also conducted before analysing the results. This was made by 
comparing how the different groups answered five manipulation questions. The results showed that 
there were significant differences between the groups regarding all of the manipulation questions. 
Furthermore, the between group differences was in the expected direction: The respondents who 
viewed negative advertisements stated that the ad gave a more negative picture of the opposing 
parties, the policies of the opposing parties and the state of Sweden than the respondents who viewed 
positive advertisements. Additionally, the respondents who viewed positive advertisements stated that 
the advertisement gave a more positive picture of the own party, and the own policies. Thus, it can be 
                                                     
103
 Boije, Edvin, E-mail conversation, 2015, 16 of April.   
104
 Gilston (2015).   
105
 The participation agreement of the Citizens panel (SW: Medborgarpanelens deltagaravtal).    
27 
 
concluded that the manipulation of the independent variable had the intended effect. In other words, 
the negative advertisements was actually perceived as more negative than the positive advertisements. 
 
6.2 Effect of negative and positive campaigning on political participation  
It has become time to clarify if main hypotheses 1a and 1b are supported by the empirical results: Do 
exposure to negative campaign messages suppress Swedish voters’ political participation (hypothesis 
1 a), whereas positive messages do not produce any effect? (Hypothesis 1b)   
 
The ANOVA analysis provided no evidence for hypothesis 1a since no significant differences were 
detected. Although group A, where the respondents was exposed to two positive advertisements, rates 
slightly higher on political participation than group D, where the respondents was exposed to two 
negative advertisements (,4080 as compared to ,4018 on a scale ranging from 0-1) the difference is far 
from being statistically significant. Group B, had the same participation-rating as group D (,4018) and 
group C had an even lower rating than group D (,4009). Finally, the control group, where the 
respondents did not view any of the films had the lowest rating (,3958) Yet, none of these differences 
are significant. The insignificant difference between group A and the other groups provides support 
for hypothesis 1b: Positive campaign messages did not produce any effect on political participation. 
Figure 4 illustrates the remarkably small differences between the groups.  
 
Figure 4. Mean results of political participation with 95 % CI error bars 
 
 
 
It can also be noted that the insignificant results persisted when comparing the differences between the 
separate groups with Tukey HDS - These results are discussed more in the conclusions.      
 
Although no evidence for the first main hypothesis were found, it can still be the case that there are 
significant effects for respondents with certein characteristics. Does partisanship, political knowledge 
or political interest moderates the relationship between exposure to negative or positive messages and 
political participation? In order to test if there are any interaction effects due to these factors,  
regression analyses were performed which is illustrated in table 1 and table 2 below. 
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Model 0 in table 1 illustrates the effect on political participation for the respondents in group D, who 
were exposed to two negative advertisements. The table illustrates that there was no significant 
difference between the respondents in group D and the respondens in the other groups. Futhermore, 
Model 0 showes that the predicted value of a respondent who was not a part of group D have a 
participation level of  0,403 (on a scale ranging from 0-1).  
 
In model 1, the focus is on the relationship between negative messages, participation and gender. 
Firstly, it may be observed that the female respondents rated slightly higher on participation. However, 
model 1 demonstrates that gender does not moderate the relationship between exposure to negative 
messages and participation.  
 
Model 2 demontrates the examination of the potential interaction effect of partisanship. Once again 
there is no significant interaction effect. Thus, it can be noted that there is no empirical support 
suggesting that negative messages decreases participation more among independents than among 
partisans (hypothesis 1c).  
 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Political participation  
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Exposure to negative messages 
(Group D) 
 -,001 (,010) -,009 (,013) ,006 (,021) ,091 (,168)  -,015 (,365) 
Gender (Woman)  ,026* (,011) ,032*** (,010) ,057** (,020)  ,035*** (,010) 
Gender * 
Exposure to negative messages  
 ,025 (,022)  ,  
Partisanship (Partisan)   ,056*** (,013)   
Partisanship * 
Exposure to negative messages 
  ,008 (,023)   
Political knowledge (0-1)    -,009 (,103)  
Political knowledge * 
Exposure to negative messages 
   -,065 (,184)  
Political interest (0-1)      ,152*** (,021) 
Political interest*  
Exposure to negative messages 
     ,043 (,044) 
Intercept  ,403*** (,005) ,391*** (,006) ,345*** (,011) ,384*** (,099)  ,350*** (,009) 
Adjusted R
2 
  ,000 ,004 ,018 ,016  ,043 
N  2445 2068 1943 475   1863 
Table 1. Regression analysis with interaction effects: Negative messages 
Note: * p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001***. Unstandardized B-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable Political 
participation is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 (0 = low political participation, 1 = high political participation). The same scale 
applies to the variables Political knowledge (0= low political knowledge, 1= high political knowledge). and Political interest (0= 
low political knowledge, 1= high political knowledge). Partisanship is a dichotomous variable (0= Independent 1= Partisan). 
Exposure to negative messages is a dummy coding out of group D. Since gender was not equally distributed in the experimental 
groups, gender is controlled for in model 2, 3 and 4See Regression Diagnostic s in Appendix H. 
  0= low political knowledge, 1= high political knowledge. 0= low political interest, 1= high political interest). The variable 
partisanship is measures on a scale from -4 to 4 (-4= independent, 4=partisan). Political knowledge and political interest is 
measuered on a sca from 0 to 1   See appendix…for the SPSS-output that the regression analysis is based on and 
appendix…for r gression diagnostic.  “Exposure to negative messages” is a dummy coding f group D. 
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Concidering political knowledge in model 3, there is no significant interaction effect of this factor 
either. Henceforth, there is no support for the presumption that negative messages suppress 
participation more for voters’ with low political knowledge than for well-informed voters’ (hypothesis 
1e).  
 
Lastly, model 4 illustrates that political interest does not interact with the focal relationship. Thus, no 
evidence in line with the expectation that negative messages suppress participation more for voters’ 
low on political interest as compared to interested voters (hypothesis 1g). 
 
 
 
 
Model 0 in table 2 illustrates the effecton political participation for the respondents in group A, who 
was exposed to two positive television advertisements. The table showes that no significant effect 
could be identified. Model 0 also showes that the predicted value of a respondent who was not 
included in group A have a participation participation level of  ,401.  
 
Model 1 demonstrates that there is no significant interaction effect of gender, regarding the 
relationship exposure to positive campaign messages and political participation.   
 
Model 2 illustrates that there were no significant diffrence between the respondents who were 
independents and partisans regarding political participation when it comes to exposure to positive 
messages either. Consequently, hypothesis 1d is supported. 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Political participation  
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Exposure to positive messages 
(Group A) 
,007 (,010) ,020 (,013) ,002 (,023) -,422* (,178)  -,003 (,016) 
  Gender (Woman)  ,041*** 
(,011) 
,032** (,010) ,055** (,020)  ,035*** (,010) 
Gender * 
Exposure to positive messages  
 -,039 (,022)    
Partisanship (Partisan)   ,055*** (0,12)   
Partisanship * 
Exposure to positive messages 
  ,006 (,026)   
Political knowledge (0-1)    -,159 (,101)  
Political knowledge * 
Exposure to positive messages 
   ,466* (,189)  
Political interest (0-1)      ,149*** (,021) 
Political interest*  
Exposure to positive messages 
     ,049 (,043) 
Intercept  ,401*** (,005) ,384*** 
(,0006) 
,346*** (,011) ,514*** (,097  ,347*** (,009) 
Adjusted R
2 
  ,000 ,005 ,018 ,023  ,043 
N  2445 2068 1943 475  1863 
Table 2. Regression analysis with interaction effects: Positive messages 
Note: The results are conducted, and structured, in the same way as the results in table 1. Exposure to positive 
campaigning is a dummy coding out of group A. See Regression Diagnostics in Appendix G. 
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In model 3, a significant interaction effect can be observed, indicating that there is a difference 
between those with high political knowledge and those with low knowledge. Thus, it can be noted that 
hypothesis 1 f, with the presumption that positive messages will not produce any effect for neither of 
the voter groups, is not supported.  In order to interpret this finding, and understand the table in detail, 
I calculated a predicted value of political participation for four fictional persons, following the steps 
below:  
 
1) Firstly, four fictional persons, who differs in regard to exposure to positive campaign messages 
and political knowledge, was made up:  
 
 Person 1: Exposure to the positive ads (value 1), high political knowledge (value 1).   
 Person 2: Exposed to the positive ads (value 1), low political knowledge (value 0).  
 Person 3: No exposure to the positive ads (value 0),  high political knowledge (value 1).  
 Person 4: No exposure to the positive ads (value 0), low political knowledge (value 0).  
 
2) Thereafter the interaction effect of the fictional persons was calculated, using following formula: 
The political knowledge-level of the person*Exposure/ no exposure to the positive campaign 
messages.   
    
3) The predicted values on participation could then be calculated, using the following formula: 
Intercept+coefficient for exposure to positive messages*the persons value on exposure to positive 
messages+coeficcient for political knowledge*the persons value on political 
knowledge+coeficient for the interaction effect*the interaction effect for the person= predicted 
value of political participation.  
 
The results are demonstrated in figure 5 below.  Person 1, with a high political knowledge, have a 
significantly higher predicted value on political participation than person 2, who is a person with  low 
political knowledge (,399 as compared to ,092). Futhermore, person 2 also have a substantially lower 
predicted value than person 4, who share the low knowlede but have not been exposed to the negative 
advertisements (,092 as compared to ,514). Person 2 also have a clearly lower predicted value than a 
respondent who were not included in group A, without taking knowledge into account (,092 as 
compared to the intercept in model, table 2: ,401). Therefore, the analysis indicates that positive 
campaign messages is likely to suppress political participation for voters’ with low political 
knowledge. Regarding highly knowledgeble voters’, positive messages do not suppress participation. 
Instead, it  appears to have a slightly mobilizing effect. This conclusion can be drawn since person 1 
has a higher predicted value than person 3 (399, as compared to ,355) who share the high knowledge 
level, but who was not exposed to positive campaign messages.  
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Continuing to model 4 in table 2, the absence of a significant interaction effect of political interest is 
demonstrated.  
 
Finally, the results presented above are summarized in table 3, with the hypotheses as the basis.   
 
   
 
Hypothesis 
 
Supported? 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Supported? 
 
Main hypothesis 1a: Negative 
campaign messages will 
suppress Swedish voters’ 
political participation.  
 
No, the ANOVA 
analysis showed no 
significant 
differences between the 
respondents who were 
exposed to negative ads and 
the other groups.   
 
Hypothesis 1e: Negative 
campaign messages will 
suppress political 
participation more for voters’ 
who are low on political 
knowledge as compared to 
highly knowledgeable voters’. 
 
No, the regression 
analysis did not find 
any evidence for 
that.   
 
Main Hypothesis 1b: Positive 
campaign messages will not 
produce any effect on 
Swedish voters’ trust in 
politicians. 
 
Yes, the ANOVA 
analysis showed no 
significant 
differences between the 
respondents who were 
exposed to positive ads and 
the other groups. 
 
Hypothesis 1f: Positive 
campaign messages will not 
produce any effect for neither 
voters’ who are low on 
political knowledge, nor 
highly knowledgeably voters’.   
 
No, exposure to 
positive campaign 
messages had a demobilizing 
effect for the respondents 
with low knowledge, whereas  
highly knowledgeble voters’ 
were mobilized .   
 
Hypothesis 1 c: Negative 
campaign messages will 
suppress political 
participation more for political 
independents as compared to 
partisans. 
 
 No, the regression 
analysis did not find 
any significant 
proves for that. 
 
Hypothesis 1g: Negative 
campaign messages  will 
suppress political 
participation more for voters’ 
with a small political interest 
as compared highly 
interested voters’. 
 
No, no significant 
interaction effect 
was identified.  
 
Hypothesis 1d:  Positive 
campaign messages will not 
produce any effect for neither 
political independents, nor 
partisans.     
 
Yes, the regression 
analysis showed no 
significant 
differences between the 
groups.   
 
Hypothesis 1h: Positive 
campaign messages will not 
produce any effect for neither 
voters’ with a small political 
interest, nor highly interested 
voters.     
 
Yes, the regression 
analysis showed no 
significant  
differences between the 
groups.   
Table 3.  Summary of the results: Effects on Political Participation 
Figure 5. The interaction effect of political knowledge  
Person 1 
Person 2 
Person 4 
Person 3 
High  political 
participation 
Low  political 
participation 
Low  political 
knowledge 
High political 
knowledge 
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6.3 Effect of negative and positive campaigning on trust in politicians 
Continuing with the second main hypotheses of this study: Does negative campaign messages 
decrease Swedish voters’ trust in politicians, whereas positive campaign messages do not produce any 
effect? The results from the ANOVA-analysis indicated that there are some evidence in line with the 
first main hypothesis: Group D showed up a lower rate on trust in politicians than the other treatment 
groups (,4764 on a scale ranging from 0-1). Furthermore, Group A had the highest rate as compared to 
the other treatment groups (,5031). Group B and C was rated somewhere in between group A and 
group D (Group B: 4,931. Group C: ,4909). Somewhat surprisingly, the control group had the highest 
rate of all the groups (,5918). Hence, the substantive difference occurred between those who were 
exposed to some campaign message and those who were not.  This is an interesting finding that will be 
discussed more in the following chapters.              
 
Figure 6. Mean results of trust in politicians with a 95 % CI error bars 
 
 
 
When comparing the variance between separate groups with Tukey HDS, it becomes clear that the 
differences between the treatment groups are not significant. However, the control group has a 
significantly higher trust-rate than all the other groups
106
. Thus, main hypothesis 2a is supported: The 
analysis demonstrates that trust in politicians is likely to decrease for those who are exposed to 
negative campaigning. However, the analysis indicates that trust in politicians is likely to decrease also 
for those who are exposed to positive campaign messages. Thus, no support was found for main 
hypothesis 2b.  
 
The question is then whether there any factors that moderate the focal relationship between exposure 
to negative and positive campaigning and trust in politicians? In order to examine that,  regression 
analyses were performed once again.  Those are illustrated in table 4 and 5.  
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Model 0 in table 4 illustrates the effect of negative campaign messages on trust in politicians. A 
significant diffrence can be observed, probably due to the significant difference as compared to the 
control group.  Model 0 also showes that the predicted trust rate of a respondent who was not a part of 
group D is ,501 (on a scale ranging from 0-1).  
 
When studying model 1, it can be noted that there is no significant interaction effect due to gender 
although the female respondents reported a slightly higher trust in politicians than the male.    
 
As shown in model 2, there is no significant interaction effect of partisanship. Thus, there is no 
support for the expectation that negative campaigning decreases trust in politicians more for 
independents then for partisans (hypothesis 2c).  
 
Turning to political knowledge in model 3, no evidence is found that suggests that voters’ with a small 
political knowledge differs from highly knowledgeable voters’. Thus, there is no support for 
hypothesis 2e.   
 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Trust in politicians  
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Exposure to negative messages  
(Group D) 
 -,024* (,011) -,013 (,015) -,023 (,023) ,014 (,200)  -,013 (,018) 
Gender (Woman)  ,029* (,012) ,024* (,011) ,001 (,023)  ,032** (,011) 
Gender * 
Exposure to negative messages  
 -,024 (,024)    
Partisanship (Partisan)   ,035* (,014)   
Partisanship * 
Exposure to negative messages 
  ,018 (,025)   
Political knowledge (0-1)    ,053 (,113)  
Political knowledge * 
Exposure to negative messages 
   -,046 (,211)  
Political interest (0-1)      ,108*** (,024) 
Political interest*  
Exposure to negative messages 
     -,014 (,051) 
Intercept  ,501*** (,005) ,487*** (,007) ,463*** (,013) ,449*** (,108)  ,457*** (,010) 
Adjusted R
2 
  ,002 ,003 ,007 ,003  ,015 
N  4561 2148 2001 502  1854 
Table 4. Regression analysis with interaction effects: Negative messages 
Note: * p<.05, **p<.01, p<.001***. Unstandardized B-coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable Trust in 
politicians is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 (0 = low political participation, 1 = high political participation). The same scale 
applies to the variables Political knowledge (0= low political knowledge, 1= high political knowledge) and Political interest (0= 
low political knowledge, 1= high political knowledge). Partisanship is a dichotomous variable (0= Independent, 1= Partisan. 
Exposure to negative messages is a dummy coding out of group D. Since gender was not equally distributed in the 
experimental groups, gender is controlled for in model 2, 3 and 4See Regression Diagnostics in Appendix H.  
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Finally, in model 4 point demonstrates an absence of interaction effect of political interest. 
Consequently, no empirical support for hypothesis 2g can be found either.  
 
 
 
 
In table 5, Model 0 demonstrates an absence of a significant effect of positive messages on trust in 
politicians. Additionally, the model demonstrates that the percipted value for a person who was not a 
part of group A is ,492.  
 
Model 1 shows that there does not appear to be any significant interaction effect due to gender, 
regarding the relationship.    
 
Continuing to model 2,  again an abcence of an interaction effect of partisanship is illustrated. Hence, 
hypothesis 2d is supported.  
 
In Model 3, an insignificant interaction effect of political knowledge can be observed. Consequently, 
hypothesis 2f is supported as well.   
 
In model 4, it is demonstrated that there is no significant interaction effect due to political interest 
either. Consequently,  hypothesis 2h is supported.  
 
Finally, the results concerning the relationship between exposure to negative and positive campaign 
messages and trust in politicians are summarized in table 6 below.  
 
 
 Dependent variable: Trust in politicians  
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Exposure to positive messages 
 (Group A) 
 ,011 (,011) ,019 (,015) ,015 (,022) -,005 (,192)  ,014 (,018) 
Gender (Woman)  ,028* (,012) ,024* (,011) -,001 (,023)  ,032* (,011) 
 Gender * 
  Exposure to positive messages  
 -,019 (,024)    
Partisanship (Partisan)   ,044** (,014)   
Partisanship * 
Exposure to positive messages 
  -,025 (,028)   
Political knowledge (0-1)    ,064 (,111)  
Political knowledge * 
Exposure to positive messages 
   -,113 (,219)  
Political interest (0-1)      ,111*** (,024) 
Political interest*  
Exposure to positive messages 
     -,024 (,048) 
Intercept  ,492*** (,005) ,480*** (,007) ,450*** (,012) ,431*** (,107)  ,451*** (,010) 
Adjusted R
2 
  ,000 ,002 ,007 -,007  ,015 
N  2561 2148 2001 502  1854 
Table 5. Regression analysis with interaction effects: Positive messages 
Note: The results are conducted, and structured, in the same way as the results in table 4. Exposure to positive 
messages is a dummy coding out of group A.  See Regression Diagnostics in Appendix H.  
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Hypothesis 
 
Supported? 
 
Hypothesis? 
 
Supported? 
 
Main hypothesis 2a: 
Negative campaign 
messages will decrease 
Swedish voters’ trust in 
politicians. 
 
Yes, the ANOVA 
analysis showed 
that the respondents who 
were exposed to negative 
messages had a significantly 
lower trust-rate then the 
control group.   
 
Hypothesis 2e: Negative 
campaign messages will 
decrease trust in politicians 
more for voters’ who are low 
on political knowledge as 
compared to highly 
knowledgeable voters’. 
 
No, the regression 
analysis did not find 
any significant 
proves for that.   
 
Main hypothesis 2b: Positive 
campaign messages will not 
produce any effect on 
Swedish voters’ trust in 
government. 
 
No, the ANOVA 
analysis 
demonstrated significant 
diffrences between group A 
and the control group.  
 
Hypothesis 2f: Positive 
campaign messages will 
produce any effect for neither 
voters’ who are low on 
political knowledge, nor 
highly knowledgeable 
voters’.      
 
Yes,  the 
regression analysis 
showed no significant 
differences between the 
groups.   
 
Hypothesis 2c: Negative 
campaign messages will 
decrease trust in politicians 
more for political 
independents as compared 
to partisans. 
 
No, the regressin 
analysis showed no 
significant diffrences 
between the two voter 
groups.  
 
Hypothesis 2g: Negative 
campaign messages  will 
decrease trust in politicians 
more for voters’ with a small 
political interest as compared 
to voters’ with a high political 
interest. 
 
No, the regression 
analysis did not find 
any significant evidence for 
that. 
 
Hypothesis 2d:  Positive 
campaign messages will not 
produce any effect for neither 
political independents, nor 
partisans.      
 
Yes,  the 
regression analysis 
showed no significant 
differences between the 
groups.   
 
Hypothesis 2h: Positive 
campaign messages will not 
produce any effect for neither 
voters’ with a small political 
interest, nor highly interested 
voters’.     
 
Yes,  the 
regression analysis 
showed no significant 
differences between the two 
voter groups.   
 
7. Discussion: Is negative and positive campaigning good 
or bad for Swedish democracy?  
The findings from this study indicate that there are surprisingly small effects of negative campaigning 
on Swedish voters’. Regarding political participation, no significant effect was found, neither for the 
respondents’ in general, nor the respondents with certain characteristics.  Hence, this study has not 
found any evidence that the classical democratic ideal of citizens’ participation is neither threatened, 
nor stimulated, by negative campaigning.  
 
Regarding the effect of positive campaigning on political participation, the analysis found no 
significant effect for the respondents’ in general. However, one of the regression analyses indicated 
that positive messages rather suppress participation for voters’ with a low political knowledge, while it 
has a slightly mobilizing effect on highly knowledgeable voters’. Thus, positive campaigning appears 
to contribute to a fragmentation of the Swedish electorate: When exposed to positive messages, those 
who already are knowledgeable are likely to participate more, whereas the participation for voters’ 
with low knowledge is likely to decrease. It might be viewed as a worrisome finding, given that one 
values the democratic ideal of political equality.   
Table 6.  Summary of the results: Effects on Trust in politicians 
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Continuing to the effects on trust in politicians, the control group of the experimental study showed up 
a significantly higher trust rate than all of the treatment groups. Hence, the analysis indicated that 
negative, as well as positive campaigning, decreases Swedish voters’ trust in politicians. If the 
citizens’ do not trust the ones who have the responsibility to represent their interest, that might indeed 
be problematic for a representative democracy. However, one should avoid drawing to large 
conclusions based on this finding since it cannot be excluded that the result might be due to the studied 
campaign channel, television advertisements rather than the actual campaigning. This will be 
discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
Finally, it can be noted that no support has been found neither in line with the mobilizing hypothesis, 
nor the stimulating hypothesis, concerning political participation: Negative campaigning does not 
appear to neither suppress, not stimulate, participation. As a matter of fact, the study indicates that 
there seems to be larger effects of positive campaigning on political participation, since one significant 
interaction effect was found. However, the fact that the ANOVA analysis showed that negative 
messages decreases trust in politicians, provides some support to the demobilization hypothesis. Yet, 
once again it has to be underlined that the decreasing effect applies not only on negative messages, but 
also on positive messages. Hence, negative as well as positive television advertisements appear to 
decrease trust in politicians.  
8. Conclusions 
8.1 Summary of the central findings 
In the introduction it was stated that it is often being presumed that negative campaigns have 
devastating effects on the electorate. The picture that is painted within the public debate is fairly 
simple: It is often stated that negativity for example decrease trust in politicians, suppress voter turnout 
and contributes to cynicism. Yet, despite these presumptions, there have until now been an absence of 
empirical evidence focusing on Swedish voters’. Thus, the aim of this study was to expand the 
research field of negative campaigning by examining two potential effects on Swedish voters: Political 
participation and trust in politicians. Furthermore, I found it important to also examine the potential 
effects of positive campaigning since that campaign strategy is the opposite of negative campaigning.  
 
Based on previous studies, and my own theoretical arguments, I expected negative campaigning to 
suppress Swedish voters’ political participation (Main hypothesis 1a) as well as trust in politicians 
(Main hypothesis 2a), whereas I did not expect any effect of positive campaigning (Main hypothesis 
1b and main hypothesis 2b). In order to test the hypotheses, an experiment from a real campaign 
context, was used as the methodological tool. More specifically, the study was conducted by using the 
data set from an experimental survey from the E-panel of 2014: A data set with results that have not 
been analyzed before.   
 
The analysis demonstrated remarkably small and insignificant differences between the experimental 
groups regarding political participation. Consequently, no support for main hypothesis 1a was 
founded. These findings are in line with previous research, suggesting that there is no reliable 
evidence that negative campaigning affects voter turnout. Nevertheless, it came as a slight surprise to 
me: My expectation was that Swedish voters’, who are used to a political landscape characterized by a 
tradition of a consensus culture, would be more suspicious toward negative campaigning as compared 
to American voters’, and consequently show up a decreasing level of participation.  
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Although the null effect on political participation, the second ANOVA-analysis indicated that negative 
campaigning, as well as positive campaigning, decrease Swedish voters’ trust in politicians. Hence, 
the analysis provided support for main hypothesis 2a, whereas main hypothesis 2b, which presumed a 
null effect of positive messages, was not supported. The fact that the analysis indicated that negative 
campaigning have a decreasing effect on trust in politicians is in line with previous research, 
suggesting that negative campaigning is likely to decrease the trust in government, political efficacy 
and public mood. However, the fact that positive campaigning also appear to have a decreasing effect 
on trust in politicians is a more surprising finding. As mentioned, previous research suggest that 
positive messages are less memorable than negative messages, and therefore positive messages is 
likely to produce less of an effect. Yet, the finding from this study indicates that positive messages 
also can affect the voters’.  Furthermore, the fact that the analysis suggests that positive message can 
produce a negative effect on trust in politicians is an even more interesting finding that will be 
discussed in the following section.     
Based on previous research, I also presumed that negative campaigning would decrease political 
participation and trust in politicians more for voters’ with certain characteristics:  Political 
independents (hypotheses 1c and 2c), voters’ low on political knowledge (hypotheses 1 e and 2e) and 
voters low on political interest (hypotheses 1g and 2g). Regarding positive campaigning I did not 
expect any significant interaction effect (hypotheses 1d, 2d, 1f, 2f, 1h and 2h).  
No support was found for the presumptions that partisanship, political knowledge or political interest 
would moderate the effect of negative campaigning, neither regarding political participation, nor trust 
in politicians. Those are interesting findings, speaking against previous research as well as my own 
expectations.  
Neither did partisanship or political interest moderate the effect of positive campaigning on political 
participation or trust in politicians. However, the analysis identified one interaction effect of political 
knowledge:  Positive messages appear to stimulate participation for highly knowledgeable voters’, 
whereas the same message appears to demobilize voters’ with low political knowledge.   
8.2 Proposals for further research  
The fact that no moderating factors regarding negative campaigning were found in this study is a 
surprise since many previous studies have identified significant interaction effects. However, the 
absence of interaction effects do not, with complete confidence, proves that Swedish voters’ react in 
more similar ways than American voters, regardless of their personal characteristics. For example, one 
explanation for the weak results might be due to the type of studied negativity. It might be that we 
would have seen greater effects, especially for voters with certain characteristics, if the advertisements 
for example were more uncivil in the tone or if the negative message was targeted against individual 
politicians rather than political parties and political issues. Consequently, a suggestion for further 
research is to study the effect of different types of negativity on a Swedish setting. 
Additionally, a potential interaction effect of partisanship might have been easier to detect with a 
finely graded scale than with a dichotomous variable: It might be that some independents react 
differently than partisans, but that the analysis of this study could not detect that since all independents 
were lumped together so to speak. Thus, I call for research that develop a finely graded partisan-scale, 
and undertake the examination of partisanship on that scale.  
Furthermore, the fact that negative, as well as positive, campaign messages appear to decrease trust in 
politicians, is indeed an interesting finding that deserves further examination. Is it possible that 
Swedish voters’ basically do not like election campaigns? May it be that they are getting the feeling 
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that politicians try to brainwash them with propaganda so to speak, and consequently the voters’ 
becomes distrustful? That seems unlikely since previous research has showed that Swedish voters’ 
trust in politicians increase during election years
107
. Could it then instead be that the result is due to 
the campaign channel rather than the actual campaigning? It might be that Swedish voters’ are not 
comfortable with television advertising since it is a relatively new phenomenon in Sweden, and 
therefore the trust level decrease. May be the outcome would be different if a material that are more 
familiar to the Swedish electorate, e.g. text advertisements or posters, were used in the experiment? 
The relationship between trust in politicians and the potential different impact of different campaign 
channels is certainly an interesting topic for further research. 
 
Also, I request more research that complements the examinations about the effects of negative 
campaigning with in depth examinations about the effects of positive campaigning: This study has 
found two significant effects of positive campaigning, while only one effect of negative campaigning. 
Thus, it is about time to conduct accurate research that examines the effects of positive campaigning. 
Maybe it is not enough to state that positive campaigning attracts less attention, is less memorable and 
consequently is likely to produce less of an effect than negative campaigning?    
I would like to end this thesis by mentioning some methodological improvements that researchers 
should strive for. Firstly, experiments typically vary from real world attitude formation since messages 
is picked up by the respondents over a much shorter period of time.
108
 This is the case regarding the 
experiment of this study as well: The respondents were exposed to the campaign advertisements 
during a couple of minutes, whereas information is often achieved, and attitudes formed, over months 
or even years, out in the real world.
109
  Hence, it is often claimed that potential attitude change from 
experiments might not reflect the kind of change that persists over time. In order to avoid this 
problem, researchers should aim to measure the dependent variables a while after conducting the 
experiment.  
Finally, I would like to underline that replication across different subjects, situations and time periods 
are key-factors in order to increase the generalizability of the results
110
. Thus, more studies are 
required in order to be able to claim that the findings of this study can be generalized to the Swedish 
population, with complete confidence. However, this study has provided the first empirical evidence 
based on a Swedish setting. Hopefully, this is just the starting point.  
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Appendix A: Extracts from experimental survey 
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Appendix B: Transcription of the television advertisements (my translation 
to English)  
Positive advertisement from the social democrats:  
Stefan Löfven, party leader: Sweden should be a country where everybody can feel belief in the future. 
Therefore, we should invest in work, internship or education for all youths within 90 days. Vote for 
the social democrats.  
Positive advertisement from the liberal party:  
Jan Björklund, party leader: My future started here at Parkskolan in Skene. Margareta gave the most 
important thing that a teacher can give. She opened up new doors for us who were kids of textile 
workers. I want to give the same opportunity to everybody who grows up in Sweden. That is why I 
feel a great engagement for the school.  
Negative advertisement from the social democrats:  
A young girl: My mom is a nurse. I want to be a doctor and work with her when I have grown up. She 
tells me that I have to study and be a good student. Natural science is fun but math is difficult. Philip is 
getting help from a man who is coming home to them. My mom tells me that we cannot afford that. I 
am wondering how things will go for me. Stefan Löfven, party leader: Sweden should be a country 
where everybody can feel belief in the future. Together we can make a better Sweden. For everybody. 
Vote for the social democrats.  
Negative advertisement from the liberal/ conservative alliance:   
A “commercial voice”: Soon an election is coming up. Will it be the alliance again? Or are you 
considering something else? Since the left/green parties have failed to reach agreements before the 
election, they will have difficulties doing that after the election as well. That means that you will get 
something else than you were looking for. Additionally, they cannot show how they are going to pay 
for everything they promise. It will cost. More than it is worth. The alliance is sticking together and 
promising more work. How do you choose?  
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Appendix C: Operationalization of political participation 
 
 
Appendix D: Operationalization of trust in politicians 
 
Note: Question 4, 5 and 7 were excluded when creating the index since those questions do not 
concerns events that the respondent can be said to control.    
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Appendix E: Operationalization of partisanship 
 
 
Appendix F: Operationalization of political knowledge 
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Appendix G: Operationalization of political interest  
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Appendix H: Regression Diagnostic 
Linearity 
Exposure to positive and negative campaign messages gender, and partisanship were dichotomous  variables. 
This makes it difficult to check these variables for linearity. However, the relationship between the independent 
variables and the dependent variables were tested. Furthermore, the relationship between the interaction 
variables and the dependent variables were examined.  
Table 1 and 2: 
* Political Knowledge - Political Participation: A cubic line and a quadratic line proved to be slightly better fits 
then a linear line (cubic R2=,060) (quadratic R2=,056) (linear=,047) However, no major conclusions should be 
drawn since the differences are very modest.   
* Political Interest - Political Participation: A cubic and a quadratic line suited the relationship slightly better 
than a linear line here as well (cubic R2= ,059) (quadratic R2= ,056) (linear R2= ,055). However, once again the 
differences are very small and therefore no major conclusions should be drawn.  
*The interaction effect of political knowledge – Political participation, negative messages: A linear line, a 
quadratic line and a cubic line suited the relationship to the same extend (R2= ,002).  
*The interaction effect of political interest – Political participation, negative messages: A linear line, a quadratic 
line and a cubic line suited the relationship to the same extend (R2= ,012). 
*The interaction effect of political knowledge – Political participation, positive messages: A linear line and a 
quadratic line suited the relationship to the same extend (linear and quadratic line R2= ,012). 
* The interaction effect of political interest – Political participation, positive messages: A linear line and a cubic 
line suited the relationship to the same extend (linear and quadratic line R2= ,012). 
Table 4 and 5:  
* Political Knowledge - Trust in Politicians: A linear line, a quadratic line and a cubic line suited the relationship 
to the same extend (R2= ,001). 
* Political Interest - Trust in Politicians: A linear line, a quadratic line and a cubic line suited the relationship to 
the same extend (R2 = ,012)   
*The interaction effect of political knowledge – Trust in politicians, negative messages: A cubic and a quadratic 
line suited the relationship marginally better than a linear line (cubic R2= ,002) (quadratic R2= ,002) (linear R2= 
,001). However, the differences are very small and all the R2 values are very low. Thus, no major conclusions 
should be drawn. 
* The interaction effect of political interest – Trust in politicians, negative messages: A linear line, a quadratic 
line and a cubic line suited the relationship to the same extend (R2= ,012). 
*The interaction effect of political knowledge – Trust in politicians, positive messages: A linear line and a 
quadratic line suited the relationship to the same extend (linear and quadratic line R2= ,012). 
* The interaction effect of political interest – Trust in politicians, positive messages:  A cubic and a suited the 
relationship slightly better than a linear line (cubic R2= ,003) (linear R2= ,001). However, the difference is very 
small and both the R2 values very low.  Therefore, no major conclusions should be drawn. 
 
In summary it can be stated that there were some problems with linearity since the linear line was not always the 
most appropriate fit and since low R2 values showed up in general. However, not of the other lines offered a 
substantially better fit.  
    
Multicollinearity 
There were no problems with multicollinearity.  
Table 1 and 2: VIF values were clearly under the critical value 5 (all values <1.052) and tolerance values were 
clearly over ,2 (all values > ,951) 
 
Table 4 and 5: VIF values were clearly under the critical value 5 (all values <1,066) and tolerance values were 
clearly over ,2 (all values > ,938) 
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Error terms  
The histograms showed that the error-terms were fairly evenly distributed – the histogram to the left is an 
illustrative example of that. However, the error-terms on political knowledge were far from evenly distributed: 
As the histogram to the right illustrates the large majority of the respondents were highly knowledgeable.  
 
  
Furthermore, the error terms were homoscedastic and evenly distributed across the regression line (both with 
political participation and trust in politicians as the dependent variable). Yet, political knowledge was an 
exception here as well which the partial regression plot below illustrates.  
 
There was not much of autocorrelation. The Durbin-Watson values were 2,054 for trust in politicians and 2,036 
for political participation, which is between the appropriate values 1, 5-2, 5.  
 
 
Extreme cases 
No influential extreme cases: All standardized DFBeta values were within the critical values -2 to 2 (political 
participation= all values between -,053 and ,256, trust in politicians= all values between -,023 and ,131 ).  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
   
